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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-WASHINGTON'S STANDARD FOR DETERMINING
INEFFECrIVENESS OF COUNsEL-State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 576
P.2d 1302 (1978).
Defendant, Jerry Jury, crashed into a parked truck while driving with
two passengers, Mike Perry and Laura Daarud. I Although all escaped se-
rious injury, witnesses claimed that Jury appeared slightly shaken up and
perhaps intoxicated. When the police arrived Jury became belligerent and
was placed under arrest. While handcuffed and seated in the back of a
police car, he kicked out one of the door windows. At the police station,
Jury struck a police officer in the face during an argument concerning a
breathalyzer test. Jury was charged with first degree malicious mischief2
for kicking out the car window and third degree assault3 for striking the
officer. 4
After being convicted of both charges, Jury appealed, alleging, inter
alia,5 that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to trial coun-
sel's inadequate preparation. 6 This allegation was made after defense
counsel had met with defendant Jury for half an hour on August 10; had a
brief telephone conversation with Perry; spent half an hour analyzing the
police report on August 22; met again with the defendant for half an hour
on August 24, becoming aware for the first time of a possible insanity
defense; took an hour to prepare an insanity plea on August 25, which he
1. State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 258, 576 P.2d 1302, 1304 (1978).
2. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.48.070(b) (1977).
3. WAsH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.030 (1977).
4. State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 258, 576 P.2d 1302, 1304 (1978).
5. See Brief of Appellant at vi, State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 576 P.2d 1302 (1978). Counsel
for appellant made nine assignments of error, including charges that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in refusing to grant a continuance or a motion for a new trial; that the evidence was insufficient
to support the conviction; that the defendant's absence when the judge, deputy prosecuting attorney,
and defense counsel submitted additional instructions to the jury constituted reversible error; that the
jury was improperly instructed; and that the state failed to meet its burden of proof.
6. State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 258-59, 576 P.2d 1302, 1304-05 (1978). General studies
on the right to effective assistance of counsel can be found in: Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of
Counsel, 42 CIN. L. REv. I (1973); Craig, The Right to Adequate Representation in the Criminal
Process: Some Observations, 22 Sw. L.J. 260 (1968); Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Is-
sues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1175 (1970); Katz, Gideon's Trumpet: Mournful and
Muffled, 55 IOWA L. REv. 523 (1970); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964); Comment,
Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relieffrom Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13
CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1 (1977); Comment, Effective Representation-An Evasive Substantive
Notion Masquerading as Procedure, 39 WASH. L. Rev. 819 (1964); Note, Effective Assistance of
Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1434 (1965); Note, Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531 (1963).
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argued in court with a motion for a continuance on August 30; prepared
for trial on August 31 for six hours and had a subpoena issued for
Daarud, the second passenger in Jury's car; again sought a continuance
on September 1 and, after it was denied, presented his client's case to the
jury; and, after the trial, filed a motion for a new trial. 7
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for third de-
gree assault 8 but reversed the conviction for first degree malicious mis-
chief, finding that trial counsel's lack of preparation denied Jury his sixth
amendment right to effective representation. 9 State v. Jury thus became
the first Washington case in which a conviction was reversed on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 10
This note first examines the development of the standards currently ap-
plied in Washington for determining whether a defendant has been de-
nied effective assistance of counsel and whether that denial was prejudi-
cial. It then analyzes the Jury court's application of the standards, and
concludes that the court's interpretation of the standards, while better
reasoned than prior Washington case law, is not supported by Washing-
ton Supreme Court precedent. Finally, it is suggested that Jury's primary
importance is the increased pressure it may place on the Washington Su-
preme Court to review and clarify this area of Washington law.
I. PRIOR CASE LAW-CONFUSION IN THE COURTS
A. The Development of the Standard for Determining Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
In 1917 the Washington Supreme Court heard its first defense based
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I I The court did not, how-
7. State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 259, 576 P.2d 1302, 1305 (1978).
8. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text infra.
9. 19 Wn. App. at 264-65, 576 P.2d at 1307.
10. Prior to Jury two convictions in Washington were reversed ostensibly due to ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. State v. Cory, 62 Wn. 2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963): State v. Hartwig, 36 Wn.
2d 598, 219 P.2d 564 (1950). However, both involved actions of the state which prevented effective
representation. In Hartwig, defense counsel was appointed an hour and fifteen minutes before trial
and the court refused a continuance. The Washington Supreme Court stated that "[tlhe constitutional
right to have the assistance of counsel, Art. I, § 22, carries with it a reasonable time for consultation
and preparation, and a denial is more than a mere abuse of discretion; it is a denial of due process of
law in contravention of Art. I, § 3 of our constitution." Id. at 601, 219 P.2d at 566 (citations omit-
ted).
In Cory, sheriff's officers eavesdropped on conversations between the defendant and his attorney.
The court found that privacy is a prerequisite to effective representation. State v. Cory, 62 Wn. 2d at
374, 382 P.2d at 1020. These cases are accordingly distinguishable from Juo , where the denial of
effective representation was caused solely by the conduct of defense counsel.
11. State v. Kelch, 95 Wash. 277, 163 P. 757 (1917).
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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
ever, formulate a definite standard upon which to judge whether a defen-
dant had been denied his constitutional right 12 to effective assistance of
counsel until it decided State v. Mode 3 in 1961. In Mode the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held that "[i]t is only when the incompetence or
neglect of a lawyer ... results in the violation of a constitutional right by
reducing the trial to a farce that a new trial will be granted."'14 Although
no specific constitutional provision was cited, presumably the right re-
ferred to rested in the fourteenth amendment due process guarantee. 15
12. Prior to 1963 the right to effective assistance of counsel in state prosecutions was grounded
on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See note 15 infra. In 1963, however, the
United States Supreme Court incorporated the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of coun-
sel into the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See note 25 infra.
13. 57 Wn. 2d 829, 360 P.2d 159 (1961). One reason the Washington Supreme Court failed to
formulate a standard prior to Mode is that the right to effective assistance of counsel was not
recognized as a specific constitutional guarantee until 1932. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932). In Powell the Court interpreted the sixth amendment right to counsel to require more than the
mere presence of an attorney at the defense table. For a brief summary of the United States Supreme
Court decisions in this area, see Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692-93 (6th Cir. 1974).
See also Waltz, supra note 6; Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Who Bears the Burden of
Proof?, 29 BAYLOR L. Rav. 29, 29-32 (1977).
14. 57 Wn. 2d at 833, 360 P.2d at 161 (footnote omitted). The "farce" terminology arose from
the 1945 case of Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), in
which the court determined the right to effective assistance of counsel was grounded on the fifth
amendment guarantee of due process of law rather than the sixth amendment right to counsel. The
court stated:
It is clear that once competent counsel is appointed his subsequent negligence does not de-
prive the accused of any right under the Sixth Amendment. All that amendment requires is that
the accused shall have the assistance of counsel. It does not mean that the constitutional rights
of the defendant are impaired by counsel's mistakes subsequent to a proper appointment.
The petitioner here must, therefore, rely upon the due process clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion which guarantees him a fair trial.
148 F.2d at 668-69.
15. If the Washington court was resting the right on the federal constitution, it must have been
contemplating the fourteenth amendment. As one commentator stated prior to the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963):
A federal attack on competence of counsel in a state criminal prosecution must find its basis
in the fourteenth amendment. It is now settled law that the sixth amendment guarantee of
representation by counsel runs only to those who are defendants in a federal prosecution ...
The present rule, as announced by the Supeme Court in the case of Betts v. Brady, [316 U.S.
455 (1942)] is that there is no absolute federally guaranteed right to counsel in a state trial, the
existence of the right being dependent upon the special circumstances of the particular case and
found in the requirement of the fourteenth amendment concepts of fundamental fairness implicit
in due process.
Hanley, Federal Habeas Corpus and Incompetence of Counsel in State Prosecutions, 33 WASH. L.
REv. 303, 304-05 (1958).
It is possible that the court was relying on the Washington Constitution, which gives the accused
in criminal prosecutions "the right to appear and defend in person, and by counsel." WASH. CONsT.
art. I, § 22. This seems unlikely, however, because the provision was not cited and the cases used as
precedent were based on the due process clause. See MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.
1960); Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959); People v. De Simone, 9 Ill. 2d 522,138
859
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Although the standard set forth in Mode was used by some Washing-
ton courts as late as 1975,16 a "new" 17 standard was in the process of be-
ing formulated by the supreme court eight months after it decided
Mode. 18 In State v. Lei the court stated that the test for determining
whether counsel has provided effective assistance is whether, after con-
sideration of the entire record, it appears that "the accused [was] afforded
a fair trial."' 19 The court cited no authority for this proposition, nor did it
indicate whether this test was intended to be a departure from the "farce"
standard developed in Mode.20 Because both the Mode and Lei tests are
grounded in a defendant's fourteenth amendment due process right to a
fair trial rather than her sixth amendment right to effective representa-
tion, 21 it is likely that the Lei court did not establish a new test, but
merely reworded the Mode "farce" standard. 22
In 1967, however, in State v. Thomas,23 the Washington Supreme
Court cited Lei as precedent for the following test: "After considering the
entire record, can it be said that the accused was afforded an effective
representation and a fair and impartial trial?" 24 This formulation
recognizes a defendant's right to effective representation in addition to
his right to a fair trial and thus appears to be a departure from Mode.
25
N.E.2d 556 (1956). But see Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1943) (also cited by the
Mode court, but relying on art. I, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution and the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution).
16. State v. Wilkinson, 12 Wn. App. 522, 530 P.2d 340 (1975). The court of appeals stated that
"[tihe general rule is that only when the incompetence and neglect of counsel results in a violation of
a constitutional right by reducing a trial to a farce, will a new trial be granted." Id. at 524, 530 P.2d
at 341-42 (footnote omitted).
17. It is not certain that a new standard has in fact been formulated. See notes 26. 64-73 and
accompanying text infra.
18. State v. Lei, 59 Wn. 2d 1, 365 P.2d 609 (1961).
19. Id. at 6, 365 P.2d at 612 (emphasis added).
20. Lei's language was again used by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Roberts, 69
Wn. 2d 921, 421 P.2d 1014 (1966). The court of appeals in Jury cited Roberts as support for what
the court considered the new standard. It therefore follows that the new standard, according to the
Jury court's analysis, was actually formulated in the same year that the Washington Supreme Court
adopted the farce standard in Mode.
21. Evidence that both standards are founded in the fourteenth amendment is indicated by their
emphasis on the trial as a whole rather than on trial counsel's performance. Moreover, Lei was de-
cided two years prior to Gideon. See notes 12 & 15 supra and note 25 infra.
22. The failure of the Lei court to recognize that it had formulated a different standard along
with the similar focus of both standards indicates that the court believed it was using the Mode stan-
dard, though slightly reworded. See note 21 supra.
23. 71 Wn. 2d 470, 429 P.2d 231 (1967).
24. Id. at 471, 429 P.2d at 232 (emphasis in original).
25. The conclusion that Thomas is a departure from Mode is buttressed by the fact that in the
interval between Mode and Thomas the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon recognized that the right to effective representation is
grounded on the sixth amendment and made obligatory on the states through the fourteenth amend-
860
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At no time, however, has the Washington Supreme Court recognized it
as such.26 As Lei and Mode appear to be the same standard, citation of
Lei in support of the different standard of Thomas indicates the confusion
of the Washington Supreme Court in this area. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that prior to 1975 the Mode and Thomas standards were used inter-
changeably and concurrently by Washington's Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals. 27
The only court prior to Jury to state that the Thomas standard is a de-
parture from, and thus replaces, the Mode test was the Washington Court
of Appeals, Division One, in State v. White,28 a 1971 decision. The
White court viewed the Thomas standard as more liberal than the Mode
test, 29 requiring a higher level of competence on the part of an attorney.
Although Division Two of the court of appeals has applied the Thomas
standard exclusively, that court has never stated whether it considered
that standard to be different from the Mode test. 30 Division Three has
ment. Emphasis thus shifted from an examination of the trial as a whole to a more focused look at
defense counsel's performance.
26. There is strong support for the argument that the Washington Supreme Court did not intend
to develop a new standard. Only a month after it decided Thomas, the court cited Mode for the con-
clusion that "a judgment will not be reversed on the grounds of incompetence of counsel unless such
incompetence appears affirmatively on review so clearly as to show that the accused was thereby
deprived of a constitutionally fair trial." State v. Piche, 71 Wn. 2d 583, 591, 430 P.2d 522, 527
(1967). The use of Mode as support for the assertion that all the accused is entitled to is a"constitu-
tionally fair trial" (note the similarity of this language with the Lei standard) indicates that the court
interpreted Lei as only a clarification, and not a modification, of Mode. If so, Thomas is simply a
further clarification of the original Mode farce standard. See notes 64-73 and accompanying text
infra.
27. See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 79 Wn. 2d 856, 490 P.2d 874 (1971); State v. Queen, 73 Wn. 2d
706, 440 P.2d 461 (1968); State v. Wilkinson, 12 Wn. App. 522, 530 P.2d 340 (1975); State v.
Dimmer, 7 Wn. App. 31, 497 P.2d 613 (1972).
28. 5 Wn. App. 283, 487 P.2d 243 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 81 Wn. 2d 223, 500 P.2d
1242 (1972). The court of appeals stated:
Definitions of "effective assistance of counsel" have been attempted many times. At one
time, our state defined the phrase as "incompetence... [which reduces] the trial to a farce..."
State v. Mode, 57 Wn. 2d 829, 833, 360 P.2d 159 (1961). The currently accepted definition is,
on its face, a more liberal one and directs us to inquire if the accused was accorded a "fair and
impartial trial." State v. Robinson, supra at 233, quoting State v. Thomas, 71 Wn. 2d 470, 429
P.2d 231 (1967).
Id. at 286-87, 487 P.2d at 245.
29. Id. at 287, 487 P.2d at 245.
30. State v. Darnell, 14 Wn. App. 432, 542 P.2d 117 (1975); State v. Hess, 12 Wn. App. 787,
532 P.2d 1173 (1975), modified on other grounds, 86 Wn. 2d 51, 541 P.2d 1222 (1975). There are
indications that Division Two did consider the Thomas standard as distinct from Mode. In Darnell,
the court interpreted Thomas to require "reasonably competent and effective counsel." 14 Wn. App.
at 436, 542 P.2d at 119.
The federal courts generally perceive the "farce" standard and the "reasonably competent counsel"
or "normal competency" standard as distinct. The "farce" standard is based on the due process
clause. See note 14 supra. But see note 73 infra. The "reasonably competent counsel" standard is
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used the two standards as one, often citing both before 1975. 31 Since
1975 the Washington courts have consistently used the Thomas standard,
though rarely recognizing it as a "new" test. 3
2
Whether the Thomas standard is indeed "a more liberal one" 33 is diffi-
cult to determine from pre-Jury cases, because prior to Jury no Washing-
ton conviction had been reversed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel under any standard. 34 Also, there has been no discernible differ-
ence in the analysis used by the courts under the different standards.
35
B. The Requirement of Showing Prejudice
While not always treated as distinct issues, 36 both ineffectiveness of
counsel and resulting prejudice must be proved before a conviction will
be reversed. 37 Unfortunately, there is little Washington case law dis-
cussing the requisite degree of prejudice which must be shown and on
grounded in the sixth amendment. See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 542-43 (4th Cir.
1977); Rickenbacker v. Warden, Auburn Correctional Facility, 550 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1976):
United States v. Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1976); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970). But see United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) (when
defense counsel fails to exercise "the customary skills and diligence [of a] reasonably competent at-
torney ... the proceedings may be said to have been reduced to a 'farce' "). Further, the standards
based on the sixth amendment are seen as demanding more from defense counsel. See Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 542-43 (4th Cir. 1977): Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1977); Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970): Fields v. Peyton. 375 F.2d
624, 628 (4th Cir. 1967).
For general discussions of the various standards, see Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-
Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. Ruv. 483, 493-99 (1976); Lee, Right to Effective Counsel: A
Judicial Heuristic, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 283-96 (1974); Comment, Ineffective Representation as a
Basis for Relieffrom Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. I.
25-53 (1977); Comment, A Standard for the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 14 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 175 (1978); Note, Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel. 1976 WAsH. U.L.Q. 503.
507-16; Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218 (1976).
31. State v. Wilkinson, 12 Wn. App. 522, 530 P.2d 340 (1975); Fleetwood v. Rhay. 7 Wn.
App. 225, 498 P.2d 891 (1972); State v. Dimmer, 7 Wn. App. 31, 497 P.2d 613 (1972).
32. State v. Adams, 91 Wn. 2d 86, 586 P.2d 1168 (1978); State v. Myers, 86 Wn. 2d 419. 545
P.2d 538 (1976); State v. Rhodes, 18 Wn. App. 191, 567 P.2d 249 (1977); State v. Price, 17 Wn.
App. 247, 562 P.2d 256 (1977).
33. State v. White, 5 Wn. App. 283, 287, 487 P.2d 243, 245 (1971).
34. See note 10 supra.
35. Because courts frequently cite both the Thomas and Mode cases when resolving ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, it is difficult to identify differences in analysis under the two standards.
See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
36. See notes 81-84 and accompanying text infra.
37. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 86 Wn. 2d 419, 545 P.2d 538 (1976); State v. Queen, 73 Wn. 2d
706, 440 P.2d 461 (1968); State v. Stockman, 70 Wn. 2d 941, 425 P.2d 898 (1967); State v.
Rhodes, 18 Wn. App. 191, 567 P.2d 249 (1977).
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whom the burden of proof rests. 38 Because no court before Jury found
trial counsel's assistance to be ineffective, few courts have found it nec-
essary to discuss prejudice. However, in State v. Queen39 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court explicitly addressed the issue, stating that it is impor-
tant to determine if an error is "prejudicial or merely harmless"'40 and that
an error is prejudicial if it "affect[s] the result."'41 This language was
interpreted by the court of appeals in State v. White42 to mean that the
defendant must establish "that substantial prejudice resulted [from the
lack of effective assistance of counsel] which probably would have
changed the result of the trial."'43 In the few cases which have touched on
the issue of prejudice, the courts have impliedly incorporated the result-
oriented analysis set forth in White.44 Thus, in Washington, at least until
Jury, the burden of proving prejudice was placed on the appellant, who
was required to show that the result at trial would probably have been
different had he not been denied effective assistance of counsel.
II. THE JURY COURT'S REASONING
The Jury court found the Mode "farce" standard outdated45 and con-
cluded that the controlling test for determining whether a defendant has
38. For a discussion of the role prejudice plays in the resolution of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, see Bazelon, supra note 6, at 29-33; Comment, Ineffective Representation as a
BasisforRelieffrom Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. I,
71-87 (1977); Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Who Bears the Burden of Proof?., 29
BAYLOR L. REv. 29 (1977).
39. 73 Wn. 2d 706, 711-12, 440 P.2d 461, 464-65 (1968). While other Washington Supreme
Court cases have touched on the issue of prejudice, the discussion terminated when no prejudice was
shown. The court did not reach the issues of the degree of prejudice necessary to grant a new trial or
on whom the burden of proof is placed. See State v. Adams, 91 Wn. 2d 86, 586 P.2d 1168 (1978);
State v. Myers, 86 Wn. 2d 419, 545 P.2d 538 (1976).
40. 73 Wn. 2d at 711, 440 P.2d at 464.
41. Id., 440 P.2d at 465 (quoting State v. Britton, 27 Wn. 2d 336, 341, 178 P.2d 341, 344
(1947)).
42. 5 Wn. App. 283, 487 P.2d 243 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 81 Wn. 2d 223, 500 P.2d
1242 (1972).
43. Id. at 289, 487 P.2d at 247. It is important to note, however, that this particular interpreta-
tion was not compelled by precedent. The burden could have been placed on the state to prove that
the error was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Furthermore, a showing that the denial might have changed the result could have been
deemed adequate. See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
44. See note 39 supra.
45. The court stated:
For a time, our Washington courts held that counsel's representation was ineffective only if it
made a farce or mockery of justice. . . .However, our Supreme Court now has devised the
following test: After considering the entire record, can it be said that the accused was afforded
an effective representation and a fair and impartial trial?
19 Wn. App. at 262, 576 P.2d at 1306 (citations omitted).
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been denied effective assistance of counsel is the Thomas standard.4 6 The
court stated that this test requires the defendant to prove two things:
"first, considering the entire record, that he was denied effective repre-
sentation; and second, that he was prejudiced thereby. '47 The Jury court
found that the Thomas standard requires closer scrutiny of trial counsel's
conduct than does the Mode test, and entitles the defendant to "reason-
ably competent assistance of counsel. '48
The court then applied the Thomas standard to determine whether Jury
had been afforded effective representation. Defense counsel was ac-
corded the presumption that court-appointed counsel is competent, 49 but
the presumption was deemed rebutted by a showing that "counsel made
virtually no factual investigation of the events leading to defendant's ar-
rest, nor did he properly support either his motion for continuance or mo-
tion for new trial with any affidavits. '50 Some reliance was also placed
on defense counsel's own admission that he was unprepared. 51 The court
concluded that defense counsel's lack of preparation was "so substantial
46. Id.
47. Id. at 263, 576 P.2d at 1307. Although a prior Washington Court of Appeals decision is not
cited for this assertion, the Jury court's language bears a strong similarity to the following statement:
Fof a defendant ... to successfully claim he was denied a fair trial by lack of effective assis-
tance of counsel, he must establish: (I) That if submission of the defense was a question of
deliberate tactical choice or judgment, no reasonable lawyer would have acted as his counsel
did or that failure to submit his defense was the result of ignorance or inadequate pretrial inves-
tigation and, (2) that substantial prejudice resulted therefrom which probably would have
changed the result of the trial.
State v. White, 5 Wn. App. 283, 289, 487 P.2d 243, 246-47 (1971) (footnote omitted), rev'd on
other grounds, 81 Wn. 2d 223, 500 P.2d 1242 (1972).
48. 19 Wn. App. at 263, 576 P.2d at 1307. See note 30 supra (discussion of the distinction
between analysis under the farce standard and analysis under the reasonably competent assistance of
counsel test).
49. Washington courts from the beginning have presumed court-appointed counsel is compe-
tent. State v. Kelch, 95 Wash. 277, 278, 163 P. 757, 757 (1917). The modem case most frequently
cited for this proposition is State v. Piche, 71 Wn. 2d 583, 430 P.2d 522, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 912
(1967), where the court stated:
Where the court appoints a licensed and practicing member of the bar to appear for and repre-
sent an indigent defendant in a criminal case, a strong presumption of competence arises from
(1) the fact of his appointment by the judge of a trial court, (2) from the fact that counsel is a
member of the bar of the highest court of the state, and (3) from the fact that the attorney is
regularly and actively engaged in the practice of law. These three factors create a presumption
that may be overcome only by a clear showing of incompetence derived from the whole record.
Id. at 591, 430 P.2d at 527.
50. 19 Wn. App. at 264, 576 P.2d at 1307. Actually, this statement is incorrect because one of
the motions for a continuance was supported by the affidavit of defendant Jury stating that he suf-
fered from " 'strong feelings of claustrophobia,' and 'a possible state of shock from being in an in-
jury accident.' " Id. at 259, 576 P.2d at 1305.
51. Id. at 264, 576 P.2d at 1307.
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that no reasonably competent attorney would have performed in such
manner" and therefore Jury had been denied effective representation. 52
Finally, the court questioned whether the denial of effective represen-
tation was prejudicial. 53 To meet his burden of proof, Jury was required
to show prejudice for both the first degree malicious mischief conviction
and the third degree assault conviction. 54 Addressing the first degree ma-
licious mischief conviction first, the court did not find the requisite
prejudice from defense counsel's failure to interview and subpoena wit-
nesses, stating that such a finding would be too speculative. 55 However,
the requisite prejudice was shown when the trial record demonstrated that
defense counsel's lack of preparation caused him to ignore completely a
potential defense. 56 This conclusion was based on trial counsel's failure
to object to a clearly erroneous jury instruction57 which the court pre-
sumed misled the jury.58 After noting that even with a correct instruction
the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, 59 the court found that
"a properly instructed jury could as easily conclude" 60 on the same evi-
ence that the defendant was guilty of a lesser-included offense. The court
52. Id.
53. Id. Although the Jury court noted that "some courts have placed the burden on the state to
show absence of prejudice once the defendant produces evidence of ineffectiveness," it determined
that the Washington Supreme Court has placed the burden on the defendant to show actual prejudice,
citing State v. Myers, 86 Wn. 2d 419, 545 P.2d 538 (1976). 19 Wn. App. at 264, 576 P.2d at 1307.
Because the Myers court did not expressly discuss on whom the burden is placed, it lends little
support for Jury's assertion. The Jury court's interpretation, however, might have been inferred
from the statement in Myers that "[ilt is well established ... that there must be some prejudice to a
defendant before a denial of the effective assistance of counsel based on joint representation will be
found." 86 Wn. 2d at 424, 545 P.2d at 541-42.
54. 19 Wn. App. at 264-69, 576 P.2d at 1307-10.
55. Id. at 265, 576 P.2d at 1308. While recognizing that incompleteness of the record may have
been due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the court held it could not determine whether the incom-
pleteness was prejudicial unless the missing evidence was supplied. Two methods of supplying the
missing evidence were mentioned. One method involves submitting evidence extrinsic to the record
by affidavit on a motion for a new trial. The other method involves submitting evidence extrinsic to
the record in a personal restraint petition and hearing. Id. at n.2, 576 P.2d at 1308 n.2.
56. Id. at 266, 576 P.2d at 1308. Trial counsel ignored the defense that because of defendant's
claustrophobia he lacked the requisite intent and capacity to commit first degree malicious mischief.
57. Although the jury was appropriately instructed on the three degrees of malicious mischief
during the trial, the error occurred when the court gave the "elements" instruction. This instruction
described the intent required for third degree malicious mischief when defining the elements for first
degree malicious mischief, thus reducing the burden of proof of intent for first degree malicious mis-
chief to the intent required for third degree malicious mischief. Id. at 266-67, 576 P.2d at 1309.
58. Id. at 268, 576 P.2d at 1309.
59. Id. This assertion was a response to defendant's contention that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the verdict. Brief of Appellant at 38-41, State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 576 P.2d
1302 (1978).
60. 19 Wn. App. at 268, 576 P.2d at 1309-10.
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reversed the first degree malicious mischief conviction and granted a new
trial.
The court dealt only briefly with the third degree assault conviction,
finding that the requisite prejudice had not been shown. The record
indicated that all witnesses to the assault had testified and that defen-
dant's mental condition was not at issue. 61 Further, trial counsel effec-
tively examined and cross-examined the witnesses on this charge, took
exception to the instructions, and argued his client's theory to the jury. 62
Thus, Jury failed to meet his burden of proof and the third degree assault
conviction was affirmed.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
Although the Jury court inferred that Washington law in this area is
well-settled, the discussion of Washington court decisions above indi-
cates that is not the case. Part IlI-A compares the Jury court's
interpretation and application of the Thomas standard with the Washing-
ton Supreme Court's analysis and concludes that assumptions made by
the Jury court were not justified by Washington Supreme Court pre-
cedent. Part III-B analyzes both the Jury court's separate treatment of
the prejudice and ineffectiveness of counsel issues and its interpretation
of Washington law concerning the degree of prejudice which must be
shown and on whom the burden of proof is placed and concludes that the
Jury court's analysis is better reasoned than prior Washington case law.
A. The Thomas Standard and its Application
The Jury court viewed Thomas as replacing the Mode test with a stan-
dard requiring greater competence on the part of defense counsel by spe-
cifically focusing on counsel's performance. 63 It is not clear, however,
whether the Washington Supreme Court shares this view.64 In no case
has the supreme court explicitly stated that the Thomas standard replaces
61. The court believed that the preparation of counsel plays a more important role where the
degree of a crime varies with different types of intent because "' [tihe accused may not be aware of
the significance of facts relevant to his intent in determining his criminal liability or responsibil-
ity.' " Id. at 266, 576 P.2d at 1308 (quoting ABA Standards, THF DEfeNSE FUNCrioN § 4.1.
commentary (Approved Draft, 1971)).
62. Id. at 269, 576 P.2d at 1310.
63. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra. The Jury court did not look at any aspect of
the trial on the issue of ineffectiveness (though it did on the prejudice issue), finding ineffectiveness
on the lack of pretrial preparation alone. Clearly, the Jury court focused on counsel's conduct rather
than on the trial or even on the conduct's effect on the trial.
64. See note 26 supra.
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that of Mode. Further, in State v. Adams,65 decided after Jury,66 the
Washington Supreme Court declined "to decide whether to adopt a new
standard."'67 The standard proposed by defense counsel in Adams re-
quired that defendant receive "reasonably effective assistance" 68 and fo-
cused attention directly on counsel's conduct. 69 If the Mode standard has
been replaced by the Thomas standard, and Thomas requires a close ex-
amination of defense counsel's performance to determine whether a
defendant received "reasonably competent assistance," 70 as the Jury
court assumed, 71 it is difficult to understand why the supreme court
would view the standard proposed by defense counsel in Adams as
"new." 72 The supreme court's belief that the standard proposed by de-
fense counsel in Adams is a "new" standard can be fully explained if the
supreme court views Thomas as merely clarifying, rather than replacing
the Mode standard, with the focus still on the trial as a whole. 73 Thus, the
Jury court's assumption that the Mode standard is outdated is not sup-
ported by Washington Supreme Court decisions.
Whether justified by precedent or not, the Jury court did scrutinize de-
fense counsel's performance more strictly under the Thomas standard
65. 91 Wn. 2d 86, 586 P.2d 1168 (1978).
66. Jury was decided on February 14, 1978 and Adams on November 22, 1978.
67. 91 Wn. 2d at 89, 586 P.2d at 1170 (emphasis added). The Adams court did not specifically
reject the standard but merely declined to decide whether to adopt it, finding that on the facts "appel-
lant did receive effective assistance of counsel at his criminal trial under either standard." Id. (em-
phasis in original).
68. d. at 90, 93, 586 P.2d at 1170, 1172.
69. The full standard urged by defense counsel in Adams required the defendant to receive
"counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance." Id. at 90, 586
P.2d at 1171 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir.
1974)). The wording of the standard and its failure to mention the right to a fair trial indicates it
would be used to examine counsel's conduct and not the trial as a whole.
70. State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. at 263, 576 P.2d at 1307.
71. The court stated: "It is clear that the departure from the 'farce and mockery' standard is an
attempt to more closely scrutinize trial counsel's performance." Id.
72. An alternative analysis exists which might explain why the Washington Supreme Court
viewed the test proposed in Adams as a new standard. The standard urged in Adams would require
that defense counsel "perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the crim-
inal law." 91 Wn. 2d at 90, 586 P.2d at 1171 (quoting Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696
(6th Cir. 1974)). Perhaps the court thought this language required even more of counsel than was
required in Jury. This seems doubtful, however, in light of the high standard of competence required
by the Jury court. Additionally, the Adams court's emphasis was on the words "counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance" rather than on the words quoted
above. Id.
73. Because of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), the test can no longer be based exclusively on the fourteenth amendment. See note 25
supra. Some courts, however, still examine the trial as a whole, often using the "farce" standard,
rather than focusing specifically on defense counsel's conduct. See United States v. Madrid Ra-
mirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Marcelin v. Mancusi, 462 F.2d 36,
42 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Benthiem, 456 F.2d 165, 167 (1st Cir. 1972).
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than would have been justified under the Mode test. Even though defense
counsel filed and argued at least six motions, 74 met with the defendant
twice, interviewed at least one witness, analyzed the police report, and
spent an additional six hours preparing for trial, 75 the court found that
counsel's lack of preparation denied defendant effective representation. 76
This finding was based solely on counsel's lack of pretrial preparation,
without an examination of its effect on courtroom performance. 77 Clearly
there is much which defense counsel did not do. 78 The finding of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in Jury under the Thomas standard, however,
despite the work counsel performed on defendant's behalf, is the most
significant aspect of the case. It indicates that, despite prior decisions, 79
74. Brief of Appellant at 1-7, State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 576 P.2d 1302 (1978). Appel-
lant's brief indicates that the following motions were filed by defense counsel: a motion for entry of
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, two motions for continuances, a motion for a new trial, a
motion for bail, and a motion for arrest of judgment. A timely notice of appeal also was filed
although it is not clear from appellant's brief that this was action taken by trial counsel. The State did
not contest appellant's factual contentions. Brief of Respondent at 1, State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App.
256, 576 P.2d 1302 (1978).
75. 19 Wn. App. at 259, 576 P.2d at 1305.
76. While this degree of preparation may appear deficient on its face, Washington courts in the
past have been extremely deferential towards the conduct of trial counsel. See note 79 infra.
77. The effect of counsel's lack of preparation on courtroom performance is examined when the
court determines whether the defendant was prejudiced thereby. See notes 56-57 and accompanying
text supra.
78. The Jury court pointed out that defense counsel did not support any motions with affidavits
other than those from the defendant. No affidavits from family or friends familiar with Jury's history
supported his claim of claustrophobia, nor were any statements or affidavits from persons medically
qualified to diagnose Jury's psychiatric problems introduced. Defense counsel did not obtain state-
ments from witnesses concerning Jury's condition at the scene of the accident, nor was Dr. Burden.
who treated Jury two to three days after the accident, contacted. Neither of the two passengers in
Jury's car were served with a subpoena, nor was one of them even interviewed by defense counsel.
Defense counsel moved for a new trial claiming that there were three witnesses available who could
testify as to defendant's condition shortly before and after the accident, yet he failed to support this
motion with affidavits from the potential witnesses. As the court stated: "The general tenor of the
record is that counsel made no substantial effort to research the law and the facts of the case until
several days before the trial." 19 Wn. App. at 259, 576 P.2d at 1305.
79. An example of the extreme deference Washington courts accord to defense counsel is State
v. Darnell, 14 Wn. App. 432, 542 P.2d 117 (1975). In Darnell the defendant appealed from a con-
viction of armed robbery alleging the following in support of the claim that counsel provided ineffec-
tive representation:
1. Counsel failed to make any real objection to any evidence introduced by the prosecution.
and in particular counsel failed to object to the use of a witness whose name was not on the list
of witnesses furnished by the prosecution prior to trial.
2. Counsel complimented the State's fingerprint expert witness at the conclusion of his
cross-examination.
3. Counsel was "curt" with defendant while he was testifying in his own behalf.
4. Counsel introduced inflammatory, prejudicial, and irrelevant testimony concerning defen-
dant's prior criminal record, including prison time he had previously served, suspended sen-
tences, probation revocations, and defendant's entire FBI "blow back."
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at least one Washington court is willing to put teeth into the standard and
give defendants a substantive right to effective representation.
B. The Burden of Proving Prejudice
In Washington a defendant has always been required to prove that she
was prejudiced by defense counsel's ineffectiveness before her convic-
tion would be overturned.80 However, it has not always been clear
whether prejudice is an issue separate from ineffectiveness. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court stated in State v. Myers81 that "there must be some
prejudice to a defendant before a denial of the effective assistance of
counsel ... will be found."' 82 This language indicates that counsel's per-
formance is not ineffective, regardless of the degree of incompetence ex-
hibited by an attorney, if by happenstance the defendant was not preju-
diced. The court's approach in Jury is better reasoned. 83 By finding trial
counsel ineffective without first finding prejudice, the court made a
logical distinction between two distinct issues. Certainly counsel can be
ineffective with no prejudice to the defendant, as may be the case when
there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. 84 Although the
5. Counsel asked: "Do you have any vocation other than stealing?"
Id. at 433, 542 P.2d at 118.
Although no allegation was denied, the court managed to come up with a "reasonable" explana-
tion for trial counsel's conduct on each charge. As to the question concerning defendant's
"vocation," the court found that "it provided a more or less humorous transition to defendant's legiti-
mate business pursuits .... Id. at 441, 542 P.2d at 122.
80. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
81. 86 Wn. 2d 419, 545 P.2d 538 (1976).
82. Id. at 424, 545 P.2d at 541-42. The court's full statement was: "It is well established, how-
ever; that there must be some prejudice to a defendant before a denial of the effective assistance of
counsel based on joint representation will be found." Although the language is limited to cases
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on joint representation, there is no logical reason for
a distinction.
Further, the Washington Supreme Court in other cases has failed to draw a clear line between the
issues. In State v. Stockman, 70 Wn. 2d 941, 425 P.2d 898 (1967), defense counsel released all
exhibits following trial, thereby failing to protect defendant's right to appeal. The court stated: "We
are not approving of this procedure, but no prejudice has been shown.. . .A consideration of the
entire record convinces us that appellant received a fair trial and was adequately represented by his
counsel." Id. at 947, 425 P.2d at 901-02. Thus, although the case seems to turn on failure to prove
prejudice, rather than failure to prove ineffectiveness, the court still stated the defendant was "ade-
quately represented."
83. The Jury court draws a clear line between the two issues. A finding of ineffectiveness is not
dependent on a showing of prejudice. See 19 Wn. App. at 262-64, 576 P.2d at 1306-07.
84. A case in which defense counsel fell asleep during the examination of witnesses highlights
the absurdity of not separating the two issues. United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970).
The court found there was no ineffective assistance because "the testimony during the periods of
counsel's somnolence was not central to [the accused's] case .... "Id. at 931. A defense attorney
sleeping through trial unquestionably denies a defendant's right to effective representation, even if it
is not prejudicial.
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result reached under either approach may be the same, the Jury court's
approach lends clarity to the analysis.
In State v. Queen8 5 the supreme court stated that the defendant must
prove that the ineffectiveness of counsel affected the result of the trial
before a conviction will be reversed. 86 Although the supreme court has
not clarified its language in Queen, the court of appeals in State v.
White87 interpreted it to mean that the defendant must show the result of
the trial probably would have been different had he been afforded effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 88 The Jury court, however, did not follow the
White analysis, 89 finding sufficient prejudice on a showing only that the
result might have been different. 90 This analysis in Jury is more in line
with the Washington Supreme Court's application of Queen in State v.
Nist,91 where the alleged error was the wrongful admission of evidence.
In Nist the supreme court cited Queen in support of the proposition that
"[w]hen the appellate court is unable to say from the record before it
whether the defendant would or would not have been convicted but for
the error committed in the trial court, then the error may not be deemed
harmless."92
Thus, not only does the Jury court scrutinize defense counsel's con-
duct more strictly than have Washington courts in the past, but it also
requires a less stringent showing of prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Jury court states that the Thomas standard replaces
Mode, the Washington Supreme Court apparently does not believe this
85. 73 Wn. 2d 706, 440 P.2d 461 (1968).
86. Id. at 711, 440 P.2d at 464-65.
87. 5 Wn. App. 283, 487 P.2d 243 (1971), rev'd on other grounds. 81 Wn. 2d 223. 500 P.2d
1242 (1972).
88. Id. at 289, 487 P.2d at 246-47. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
89. It is not clear why the Jury court failed to follow White when resolving the prejudice issue.
since White is one of the few cases which speaks directly to the issue of prejudice in ineffective
assistance of counsel cases. Also, the Jury court cited White extensively when analyzing the issue of
ineffectiveness. Although White was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court, the reversal was
not based on the White court's analysis of the prejudice issue. Therefore, Jury's reliance on White to
help resolve the ineffectiveness issue while ignoring White when determining prejudice is unex-
plained. The Jury court may not have followed White on the prejudice issue because of a lack of
precedent supporting White's analysis. See note 43 supra. See also notes 91-92 and accompanying
text infra.
90. While the court did not state this proposition expressly it was implicit in its analysis of the
prejudice issue. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
91. 77 Wn. 2d 227, 461 P.2d 322 (1969).
92. Id. at 234, 461 P.2d at 326 (quoting State v. Martin, 73 Wn. 2d 616, 627, 440 P.2d 429.
437 (1968)).
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substitution has taken place. Further, while the court in Jury views the
prejudice and ineffectiveness issues as distinct, the Washington Supreme
Court has not always dealt with the issues separately. Finally, the Jury
court places the burden of proving prejudice on the defendant and re-
quires a showing that the result of the trial might have been different had
he not been denied effective assistance of counsel. The Washington Su-
preme Court, however, has not specifically addressed the issues of the
degree of prejudice which must be shown or on whom the burden of
proving prejudice falls.
State v. Jury reaches a manifestly reasonable result. However, because
of the lack of clarity in the opinions of the Washington Supreme Court,
and the differing interpretations of these opinions by the various divi-
sions of the court of appeals, it is difficult to predict what impact Jury
will have in the resolution of future ineffective assistance of counsel
cases. Jury's most important impact may be that it will increase pressure
on the Washington Supreme Court to review and clarify this area of
Washington law.
JoAnne L. Tompkins
